{"id":1767,"date":"2016-08-31T22:06:17","date_gmt":"2016-08-31T21:06:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/?p=1767"},"modified":"2016-09-25T16:56:18","modified_gmt":"2016-09-25T15:56:18","slug":"bachelard-on-measuring","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/?p=1767","title":{"rendered":"Bachelard on measuring"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"bachelard_essai\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Reading the second chapter<\/a> of Hans-J\u00f6rg Rheinberger<\/a>‘s ‘Epistemologie des Konkreten’ triggered me to start reading Gaston Bachelard<\/a>s writings on the philosophy of science and epistemology. I started with his ‘Essai sur la connaissance approch\u00e9e’ (1927), which is in fact his doctoral thesis and (I suppose) the first book he wrote.
\nThe following two pages struck a chord, and I am reproducing them here in the original French (from the fourth edition in 1973, pp. 52-54) and in my own, undoubtedly rather crude, English translation; as far as I know this has not been published in English anywhere:<\/p>\n

C’est par la mesure pr\u00e9cise que l’objet peut se r\u00e9v\u00e9ler comme permanent et fixe, c’est-\u00e0-dire qu’il est vraiment reconnu comme objet. Au sujet d’un jugement qualitatif, les divergences eussent au contraire \u00e9t\u00e9 si nettes que le consensus m\u00eame limit\u00e9 par le correctif des circonstances connexes e\u00fbt manqu\u00e9 d’unanimit\u00e9 et d’\u00e9nergie. Il n’appara\u00eetrait qu’en se contentant d’une ordination fortement et grossi\u00e8rement rythm\u00e9e. Et pourtant, que ce soit dans la mesure ou dans une comparaison qualitative, il n’y a toujours qu’un jugement sur un ordre\u00a0: un point vient apr\u00e8s un autre, une couleur est plus ou moins rouge qu’une autre. Mais la pr\u00e9cision emporte tout, elle donne \u00e0 la certitude un caract\u00e8re si solide que la connaissance nous semble vraiment concr\u00e8te et utile\u00a0; elle nous donne l’illusion de toucher le r\u00e9el. Voulez-vous croire au r\u00e9el, mesurez-le.<\/p>\n

On pourrait donc \u00e9noncer \u00e0 la base de la physique moderne ce double postulat m\u00e9taphysique\u00a0: ce qu’on mesure existe et on le conna\u00eet dans la proportion o\u00f9 la mesure est pr\u00e9cise. Cette double affirmation condenserait toute l’ontologie scientifique et toute l’\u00e9pist\u00e9mologie du physicien. Ainsi, d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but, subrepticement, une m\u00e9taphysique s’est \u00e9tablie que le d\u00e9veloppement monotone des mesures ne troublera pas. On aura \u00e0 la fois incorpor\u00e9 une ontologie rudimentaire et une d\u00e9finition de la connaissance qui pr\u00e9sente si peu d’exigences qu’elle sera valable \u00e0 tous les niveaux de la doctrine. Tous nos moyens de conna\u00eetre s’effaceraient devant cette comparaison d’un type tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cial qu’est une mesure. Toutes les relations du monde sensible devraient se traduire, pour \u00eatre comprises d’une mani\u00e8re satisfaisante, dans cette math\u00e9matique assez pauvre qui s’adapte \u00e0 la mesure. La mesure appara\u00eet ainsi comme l’\u00e9pist\u00e9mologie fondamentale, comme la base de l\u2019arithm\u00e9tisation de l’exp\u00e9rience. Et d’un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9 c’est la mesure qui garantit la permanence de l’\u00eatre, qui int\u00e8gre cet \u00eatre dans sa juste place et qui justifie finalement l’ontologie scientifique.<\/p>\n

Cette ontologie doit sa solidit\u00e9 \u00e0 la pauvret\u00e9 de son principe. Elle est une doctrine de l’\u00eatre en soi tr\u00e8s peu qualifi\u00e9 et m\u00eame qualifi\u00e9 au minimum. D\u00e8s qu’on accepte un objet rev\u00eatu des qualit\u00e9s multiples, on acc\u00e8de rapidement \u00e0 la notion d’apparence. D’abord cette multiplicit\u00e9, pour peu qu’elle d\u00e9passe en richesse un certain niveau, n’est plus recens\u00e9e par l’esprit. Elle donne naissance en outre \u00e0 des concepts complexes qui peuvent \u00eatre si prolixes que chacun d’eux semble d\u00e9pourvu d’extension et calque une individualit\u00e9. Aucun genre, aucune loi. Le Devenir se brise lui-m\u00eame en des devenirs partiels et particuliers, sans accord et sans harmonie. Chaque objet prend un aspect et un rythme. L’\u00eatre est \u00e9touff\u00e9 par ses attributs. Mais \u00e0 prendre contact avec les attributs de l’\u00eatre, l’esprit se rend compte du r\u00f4le qu’il joue. Les lois de la repr\u00e9sentation apparaissent alors comme les v\u00e9ritables principes de la stabilit\u00e9 des choses au d\u00e9triment d’un substantif qui n’est plus qu’un outil verbal. On s’\u00e9carte d\u00e9finitivement de l’ontologie.<\/p>\n

Il n’en est plus de m\u00eame si l’on restreint le nombre des pr\u00e9dicats \u00e9tudi\u00e9s et surtout si l’on choisit le plus stable d’entre eux pour le marquer d’une valeur \u00e9pist\u00e9mologique particuli\u00e8re. Au point de vue de la connaissance, ce choix est arbitraire, mais il est heureux. L’objet en re\u00e7oit une fixit\u00e9 qui va lui permettre de r\u00e9sister \u00e0 l’entra\u00eenement qualitatif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. L’esprit ne cherchant plus que des v\u00e9rifications d’ordre quantitatif est amen\u00e9 \u00e0 prendre tout ce qui est quantifi\u00e9 pour r\u00e9el. Le r\u00e9el se d\u00e9pouille, mais se stabilise. \u00c0 \u00e9carter tant de qualit\u00e9s secondes on croit toucher des qualit\u00e9s premi\u00e8res. On croit tenir le sujet parce qu’on a \u00e9vinc\u00e9 des attributs. On croit penser enfin le substantif puisqu’on n’en consid\u00e8re qu’un substitut. L’occasion ne se repr\u00e9sentera plus de r\u00e9duire ce sophisme ontologique, car toutes les fois qu’on r\u00e9duira des propri\u00e9t\u00e9s au pr\u00e9dicat fondamental, on croira les avoir rapport\u00e9es \u00e0 l’\u00eatre et atteint le terme de l’explication. La quantit\u00e9 n’est pourtant qu’un pr\u00e9dicat comme les autres. Mais la math\u00e9matique qui l’exprime est toute pr\u00eate, c\u2019est une science qui a une telle avance sur les autres moyens de conna\u00eetre qu’elle les absorbe tous. C’est la source de toutes les m\u00e9taphores pr\u00e9cises. De sorte qu’\u00e0 force de regarder l’\u00eatre sous la cat\u00e9gorie de la quantit\u00e9, on imagine qu’il est r\u00e9gl\u00e9 sur le nombre. L’expression donne sa coordination \u00e0 l’exprim\u00e9, et cette coordination est si solide qu’on croit toucher le lien de l’\u00eatre en soi.<\/p>\n

\"Gaston<\/a>
Gaston Bachelard and his daughter Suzanne in 1936.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

And in my English translation:<\/p>\n

It is through precise measurement that the object can show itself as permanent and fixed, that it is truly recognized as an object. In the case of a qualitative judgement, divergences would have been so distinct, that even when corrected by related circumstances, any consensus would have been lacking in unanimity and energy. Consensus would only occur if one would settle for a forced and crudely grouped ordering. And yet, both in measuring and in qualitative comparison there is always a judgement about order: one point comes after another, a colour is less or more red than another. But precision sweeps everything along, it gives such a solid character to certitude, that the knowledge seems really concrete and useful to us; it gives us the illusion of touching the real. If you want to believe in the real, measure it.<\/p>\n

So we could say that there is this double metaphysical postulate at the basis of modern physics: what we measure exists and we know it in proportion to the precision of measurement. This double assertion condenses the whole scientific ontology and the whole epistemology of the physicist. In this way, from the start and surreptitiously, a metaphysics has established itself that will not be troubled by the monotonous development of measurement. It incorporates at the same time a rudimentary ontology as well as a definition of knowledge that has so few requirements that it would be valid at all levels of the doctrine. All our means of knowing will vanish before that very special type of comparison that is measurement. In order to be understood in a satisfactory way, all the connections of the perceptible world would have to be translated into that rather poor mathematics that adapts itself to measurement. Measurement appears as the fundamental epistemology, as the basis of the arithmetisation of experience. And on the other hand it is measurement that guarantees the permancence of being, that integrates that being into its rightful place and that in the end justifies the scientific ontology.<\/p>\n

This ontology owes its solidity to the poverty of its principle. It is a doctrine of being as such that is hardly qualified and even qualified to an absolute minimum. As soon as we accept an object clothed in multiple qualities, we quickly get to the notion of appearance. In the first place, as soon as it goes beyond a certain level of richness, this multiplicity is not registered anymore by the mind. Furthermore, it gives birth to complex concepts that can be so diffuse that each of them seems devoid of extension and traces an individuality. No categories, no laws. Becoming shatters itself in partial and particular becomings, without agreement and without harmony. Every object takes on its own appearance and rhythm. Being is suffocated by its attributes. But by getting in touch with the attributes of being, the mind notices the role it plays. The laws of representation then appear as the true principles of the stability of things, at the expense of a noun that is not more than a verbal tool. We definitively separate ourselves from ontology.<\/p>\n

It is not the same anymore if we restrict the number of predicates studied and especially if we choose the most stable among them in order to mark a particular epistemological value. From the point of view of knowledge, this choice is arbitrary, but lucky. It gives the object a fixity that will allow it to resist the general qualitative drive. When the mind is left only to look for verifications of a quantitative order, it is inclined to take everything that is quantified for real. The real is dismantled, but stabilizes itself. By getting rid of so many secondary qualities, we believe that we are touching the primary qualities. We believe that we hold the subject since we have pushed the attributes aside. We believe we can finally think the substantive because we are only considering a substitute. There will be no longer an opportunity to eliminate this ontological sophism, because every time we reduce properties to a fundamental predicate, we will believe that we have related them to being and that we have reached the terminus of explanation. Even though quantity is a predicate as any other. But the mathematics that expresses it is ready to be found, it’s a science that is so ahead of other ways of knowing that it absorbs them all. It is the source of all precise metaphors, so that by looking at being under the category of quantity, we imagine that it is determined by number. The expression coordinates that what is being expressed, and that coordination is so solid, that we believe that we are touching on the connection to being as such.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Reading the second chapter of Hans-J\u00f6rg Rheinberger‘s ‘Epistemologie des Konkreten’ triggered me to start reading Gaston Bachelards writings on the philosophy of science and epistemology. I started with his ‘Essai sur la connaissance approch\u00e9e’ (1927), which is in fact his doctoral thesis and (I suppose) the first book he wrote. The following two pages struck … Continue reading Bachelard on measuring<\/span> →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1771,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1767","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-books","category-umwelt"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1767","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1767"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1767\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1779,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1767\/revisions\/1779"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1771"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1767"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1767"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.joostrekveld.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1767"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}